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TREATISES 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, Sec. 114 (5th Ed. 1985) 12 
Restatement (2d) of Torts, Sec. 588 12, 13 
Respondents file this Brief in reply to the Brief of 
Appellant Malgorzata Jung-Leonczynska ("Leonczynska"). 
I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1953). 
Leonczynska commenced this action seeking to recover 
damages from Respondents allegedly arising out of claimed 
defamatory statements made by Respondents James Elegante and Mary 
Elegante in a judicial proceeding brought by Leonczynska1s husband 
in federal court. The district court granted Respondents' Motion 
to Dismiss the Complaint in this action on the basis that the 
alleged defamatory statements were absolutely privileged. An Order 
of Dismissal was entered on July 21, 1988. Leonczynska sought at 
the same hearing to have a Default Judgment entered against 
Respondents. That motion was denied. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review on this 
appeal: 
1. Did the district court commit error in determining that 
the alleged defamatory statements with respect to which Leonczynska 
seeks relief were absolutely privileged as they were made during 
the course of judicial proceedings? 
2. Did the district court commit error in proceeding with 
the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in view of 
Leonczynska's claim she did not receive notice of the hearing? 
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3. Did the district court commit error in refusing to 
enter Default Judgment against Respondents. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Proceedings Below. 
Leonczynska commenced this action, acting pro se, in March 
1988, seeking to recover for alleged defamatory statements made by 
Respondents James M. Elegante and Mary A. Elegante during the 
course of a lawsuit filed by Leonczynskafs husband in federal 
court, Boguslaw Leonczynski v. American Express Travel Related 
Services Co., T.C.O.C.. et al.. Civil No. 85-C-884 S (the 
"Discrimination Lawsuit"). Leonczynska•s husband sought damages 
in the Discrimination Lawsuit for allegedly being terminated from 
his employment by reason of his national origin. 
After being served with the Complaint in this action, 
Respondents removed the case to federal court and filed a Motion 
to Dismiss, which was opposed by Leonczynska. Thereafter, 
Respondents determined that the federal court did not actually have 
removal jurisdiction and caused the lawsuit to be remanded to state 
court. 
On June 22, 1988 (the day the Order remanding the case was 
signed), Leonczynska sought to have a default judgment entered 
against Respondents in state court. The clerk did not do so. 
Respondents that same day, as a precautionary measure, filed in 
the state court the Motion to Dismiss which had been previously 
filed in federal court, and noticed a hearing for July 11, 1988. 
Leonczynska some days later scheduled for the same time a hearing 
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on a motion to have Default Judgment entered. At the hearing, the 
court granted the Motion to Dismiss and denied the motion to enter 
Default Judgment. The formal Order was entered on July 21, 1988. 
It is from that Order that Leonczynska appeals. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Leonczynskafs Statement of Facts does not comply with the 
rules of this court requiring citations to the Record to support 
the factual assertions. Accordingly, Respondents will set forth 
their own Statement of Facts. 
THE DEFAMATION CLAIM 
1. Leonczynska is the wife of Boguslaw Leonczynski, the 
Plaintiff in the Discrimination Lawsuit. [R. 62] 
2. The law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer ("PB&L") 
represented the Defendants in the Discrimination Lawsuit. Mr. 
Leonczynski sought to disqualify PB&L from representing the 
Defendants. [R. 62-63] 
3. The motion to disqualify filed in the Discrimination 
Lawsuit was based upon the contention that James Elegante had 
represented Mr. Leonczynski, and that Mr. Leonczynski, during the 
course of communications with Mr. Elegante, had disclosed to Mr. 
Elegante confidential information which PB&L could use against Mr. 
Leonczynski. Among the communications alleged by Mr. Leonczynski 
was one that occurred on February 13, 1984, in which Mr. 
Leonczynski allegedly disclosed confidential facts to Mr. Elegante 
respecting a potential lawsuit against American Express Travel 
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Related Services Co., Inc. [R. 62-64] 
4. In opposition to Mr. Leonczynskifs motion to disqualify 
PB&L, an affidavit signed by Mr. Elegante was filed in the 
Discrimination Lawsuit on October 14, 1985. In that affidavit, Mr. 
Elegante discussed the timing and substance of his various 
communications with Mr. Leonczynski prior to the filing of the 
Discrimination Lawsuit. These communications were set forth in 
relation to the issues before the court as to whether there was an 
attorney/client relationship between Mr. Elegante and Mr. 
Leonczynski and whether the subject matter of the communications 
between them was substantially related to the subject matter of 
the Discrimination Lawsuit. [R. 63] 
5. In his affidavit, Mr. Elegante discussed a visit he 
and his wife had with Leonczynski and his wife in February 1984. 
In an effort to put before the court the substance of the 
communications that occurred on that date, Mr. Elegante reported 
on the conversations that took place. He testified that Mr. 
Leonczynski asked him if he would be interested in representing Mr. 
Leonczynski in an action against American Express, but Mr. Elegante 
said he believed PB&L represented American Express and he did not 
wish to discuss any such problem. Mr. Elegante further testified 
in his affidavit that the conversation remained primarily at a 
"theoretical level" and described the content of that part of the 
conversation. Leonczynska claims that the following statement 
contained in Mr. Elegante's affidavit defamed her: 
While at our home that night Mr. Leonczynski 
and his wife, both of whom were lawyers in Poland 
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prior to their flight from that country, extolled 
the virtues of Polish law and its protection of 
the working class and denigrated United States law, 
which, they claimed, put U.S. workers in a servile 
plight. I insisted to Mr. Leonczynska that I did 
not want to hear about his problems with his 
employer until I was able to verify the conflict, 
and thus the conversation remained at a theoretical 
level. 
[R. 64 and 73] 
6. On October 16, 1985, the federal court held a hearing 
on Mr. Leonczynski1s motion to disqualify PB&L. At the hearing, 
Mr. Leonczynski contended that a "strict prophylactic rule" should 
be applied by the court in order "to prevent any possibilities, 
however slight, that confidential information acquired from a 
client during previous relation may subsequently be used to a 
clientfs disadvantage. To the same effect, Mr. Leonczynski also 
stated in that hearing that "all my discussion with Mr. Elegante 
was with regard to this case." [R. 64] 
7. The federal court entered an order in the 
Discrimination Lawsuit on October 28, 1985, denying the motion to 
disqualify. Mr. Leonczynski appealed that decision, again putting 
in issue the content of his communications with Mr. Elegante by 
arguing that: 
The fact is that plaintiff was the client of 
the said law firm, Ergo, the plaintiff had contacts 
also regarding this civil action . . . revealing 
to his attorney all possible pertinent information. 
[R. 65 and 141] 
8. The Tenth Circuit issued an Order on October 21, 1986, 
ruling that the denial of the motion to disqualify was procedurally 
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defective because the record lacked findings of fact on which the 
appeals court could base its review. [R. 65] 
9. In accordance with the Tenth Circuit's Order, the 
federal court held a hearing on the motion to disqualify on July 
10, 1987. Mr. and Mrs. Elegante both testified at that hearing. 
It is testimony of the Elegantes at that hearing that constitutes 
the second and third alleged defamatory statements of which 
Leonczynski complains in this action. [R. 65] 
10. In the course his testimony at the July 10, 1987 
hearing, Mr. Elegante, as he had done in his affidavit, testified 
concerning his various communications with Mr. Leonczynski prior 
to the filing of the Discrimination Lawsuit. The purpose of his 
testimony was to inform the court of the timing and substance of 
these communications so that the court could determine whether 
there was a prior attorney/client relationship and whether there 
was a substantial relationship between the subject matter of any 
communications between Mr. Elegante and Mr. Leonczynski and the 
subject matter of the Discrimination Lawsuit. During the course 
of this testimony, Mr. Elegante stated: 
He [Mr. Leonczynski] began telling me about 
some problem that he was having with the American 
Express Company. He raised the conversation almost 
immediately to a theoretical level and complained 
at some length about the American social system and 
the plight of workers in the American social 
system. He was interrupted by his wife who has a 
strident voice and who was also a lawyer in Poland. 
And she launched off into a theoretical discussion 
or dialectic concerning the benefits of the Polish 
workers under Polish laws as compared to the 
workers in America and American law. 
[R. 66 and 186] 
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11. During her testimony at the July 10, 1987 hearing, 
Mrs. Elegante discussed the nature of the conversation held at her 
home in February 1984 as follows: 
I recall — I don't recall it as well as Jim 
does. But I recall the strident nature of the 
conversation and the fact that it was raised to 
fever pitch and they were screaming to us about the 
nature of the plight — well, the plight of the 
worker in America and the terrible system of 
justice in this country, and comparing it to the 
Polish system of justice. And I remember being 
very surprised at what was happening. 
[R. 66-67 and 194-195] 
12. In October 1987, the federal court entered findings 
of fact and conclusions of law denying the motion to disqualify 
PB&L. Among other things, the court concluded that PB&L had never 
acted as counsel for Mr. Leonczynski and at no time did the 
communications between Mr. Leonczynski and Mr. Elegante ever give 
rise to an attorney/client relationship. [R. 67-68 and 212-218] 
THE REQUEST FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
13. Respondents were served with the Summons and Complaint 
in this action on May 16, 1988. [R. 45] 
14. On or about June 2, 1988, Respondents filed a Petition 
for Removal in federal district court asserting diversity 
jurisdiction. [R. 489] 
15. On June 2, 1988, Respondents hand delivered a Notice 
of Petition for Removal and a copy of the Petition for Removal to 
the Third District Court Clerk's office. [R. 494] 
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16. On June 7, 1988, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 
in federal court on the basis that the alleged defamatory 
statements were absolutely privileged as they were made during the 
course of a judicial proceeding. [R. 490] 
17. Leonczynska filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss 
in federal court and a copy of the response in state court on or 
about June 20, 1988. [R. 51] 
18. After filing the Petition for Removal, Respondents 
determined that the federal court did not, in fact, have removal 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, Respondents promptly filed a Petition 
for Remand and an Order of Remand was entered by the federal court 
on or about June 22, 1988. Notice of Remand was filed with the 
Third District Court Clerk on June 23, 1988. [R. 482-485] 
19. On or about June 19, 1988, Respondents' counsel 
received a call from Nelia Barber, law and motion clerk for the 
Third District Court, requesting a ten dollar fee for the filing 
of the Notice of Petition for Removal. On June 20, 1988, a ten 
dollar check was hand delivered to Ms. Barber. Respondents1 
counsel were then informed that the ten dollar fee was not 
necessary due to the fact that the case was going to be remanded 
back to the Third District Court. [R. 494] 
20. On June 22, 1988, the same day the Order of Remand was 
signed, but before the Notice of Remand was filed, Leonczynska 
appeared at the Third District Court Clerk's office and attempted 
to persuade the Clerk to enter a Default Judgment against 
Respondents because the Motion to Dismiss had been filed in federal 
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court but not in state court. [R. 489-492] Leonczynska did not 
deliver to the Clerk a Default Certificate or a proposed Default 
Judgment. Rather, she only delivered an Affidavit and "Request for 
Default Judgment" in the amount set forth in the Complaint. [R. 
251] 
21. The Third District Court Clerk refused to enter 
default judgment. [R. 489, 492] 
22. In order to expedite proceedings, and as a precaution, 
Respondents immediately, on June 22, 1988, refiled the Motion to 
Dismiss in Third District Court and noticed the motion up for 
hearing on July 11, 1988, at 9:00 a.m. A copy of the Motion and 
Notice of Hearing was duly served upon Leonczynska, together with 
a memorandum and Affidavit of Keith Taylor. [R. 258-259; 
Transcript of July 11 Hearing, R. 548 at p. 9] 
23. After receiving the Motion to Dismiss, and on June 27, 
1988, Leonczynska noticed a hearing on the motion to enter default 
for the same time as the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. [R. 
488] Further, on July 8, 1988, Leonczynska filed a Motion to 
Strike the affidavit of Keith Taylor. [R. 497] 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The alleged defamatory statement contained in the 
affidavit of James Elegante filed with the federal court in the 
Discrimination Lawsuit and the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Elegante 
given during the July 1987 hearing in the Discrimination Lawsuit 
are absolutely privileged because those statements were published 
during the course of a judicial proceeding. The fact that the 
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affidavit may have been seen by others outside the courtroom does 
not destroy the privilege. The affidavit and testimony of which 
Leonczynska complains were clearly related to the issues which 
existed on the motion to disqualify in the Discrimination Lawsuit 
as to the substance of the communications which had occurred 
between Leonczynska's husband and Mr. Elegante, whether an 
attorney/client relationship had existed and whether any 
communications were substantially related to the subject matter of 
the Discrimination Lawsuit. 
2. The district court properly refused to enter 
Respondents default. Respondents were not in default as they had 
filed a Motion to Dismiss in federal court after the case was 
removed to federal court. The fact that removal jurisdiction did 
not exist so that removal was improper does not mean that the 
removal never occurred and Leonczynska1s contention to the contrary 
was rejected by the federal court. Further, Leonczynska did not 
file a Default Certificate for the Clerk to sign. Leonczynska 
simply filed a "Request for Default Judgment" without even a 
proposed default judgment. A default judgment could, in any event, 
have only been entered by the court after a hearing to establish 
damages, if any. Respondents filed their Motion to Dismiss in this 
action long before the July 11, 1988 hearing on the default 
request, so the court could not have granted a default judgment at 
that time. Finally, even if it was necessary for Respondents to 
file a separate Motion to Dismiss in state court in addition to the 
Motion to Dismiss filed in federal court, any default was technical 
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and the court properly refused to enter default where the Motion 
to Dismiss was actually filed by Respondents in state court prior 
to the hearing, and the merits of the lawsuit were being actively 
contested by the parties. 
3. The district court did not err in proceeding to hear 
the Motion to Dismiss in the face of Leonczynska's contention she 
did not receive notice of the hearing. Leonczynska did, in fact, 
receive notice and actually argued the motion. Further, 
Leonczynska made no showing as required under Rule 56(f) URCP that 
she could have marshalled facts to defeat the motion if given 
additional time. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Alleged Defamatory Statements Are Absolutely 
Privileged. 
As set forth above, Leonczynska claims that the Elegantes 
defamed her by publishing three separate statements. The first 
statement was contained in Mr. Elegante's affidavit filed in 
connection with the Discrimination Lawsuit in which Mr. Elegante 
recounted the contents of the communications which occurred between 
Mr. and Mrs. Leonczynski and Mr. and Mrs. Elegante in February 
1984. The second defamatory statement complained of was simply Mr. 
Elegante's testimony at the July 1987 hearing on the motion to 
disqualify concerning those same communications. The third 
allegedly defamatory statement was contained in the testimony of 
Mrs. Elegante at the July 1987 hearing concerning those same 
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communications. [See p.5-7, paras. 5, 7 and 10, supra.] 
The district court correctly ruled that Leonczynska could 
not recover for the allegedly defamatory statements for the simple 
reason that those statements were absolutely privileged because 
they were made during the course of judicial proceedings. Prosser 
summarizes the absolute privilege which attaches to statements made 
during the course of judicial proceedings as follows: 
It likewise has been conferred upon witnesses, 
whether they testify voluntarily or not, and even 
though their testimony is by affidavit or 
deposition. The resulting lack of any really 
effective civil remedy against perjurers is simply 
part of the price that is paid for witnesses who 
are free from intimidation by the possibility 
of civil liability for what they say. Likewise, 
the privilege extends to counsel in the conduct of 
the case; and since there is an obvious public 
interest in affording to everyone the utmost 
freedom of access to the courts, it extends also 
to the parties to private litigation, as well as 
to defendant and instigators of prosecution in 
criminal cases. The privilege covers anything that 
may be in relation to the matter at issue, whether 
it be in the pleadings, in affidavits, or in open 
court. 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, Sec. 114 (5th Ed. 1985) [Emphasis 
Added]. 
Similarly, Restatement (2d) of Torts, Sec. 588 states: 
A witness is absolutely privileged to publish 
defamatory matter concerning another in 
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial 
proceeding or as part of a judicial proceeding in 
which he is testifying, if it has some relation to 
the proceeding. 
In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Hollands, 395 P.2d 537, 538 
(Utah 19 64), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the absolute 
privilege in connection with allegedly defamatory allegations 
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contained in a complaint, stating: 
The cloak of protection in judicial 
proceedings and the pleadings incident thereto 
seems imperative and obvious in almost all cases, 
and certainly this one, else few matters would be 
instituted or tried for fear of inability to prove 
an alleged wrong. 
See also, Beezley v. Hansen, 268 P.2d 1057 (Utah 1955). 
Leonczynska erroneously argues that the statements are not 
privileged because they supposedly had no "nexus or relevancy" to 
the disqualification motion in the Discrimination Lawsuit. In 
determining the relevance of an allegedly defamatory statement, the 
courts have adopted a broad standard holding that if the statement 
has any possible pertinence, the absolute privilege attaches. 
Irwin v. Ashurst, 74 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Ore. 1934) (all doubts must 
be resolved in favor of relevancy or pertinency); Jensen v. Olson, 
141 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn. 1966); Club Valencia Homeowners vs. 
Valencia Association, 712 P.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Colo.App. 1985). 
Comment C of Sec. 588 of the Restatement of Torts quoted above 
discusses the requirement that a statement have relevancy to the 
proceeding: 
The testimony to be privileged need not be 
material or relevant to the issues before the 
court, nor does the fact that the testimony is 
offered voluntarily and not in response to a 
question prevent it from being privileged if it 
has some reference to the subject matter of the 
litigation. 
The case of Bailey v. Superior Court, et al.f 636 P. 2d 144 
(Ariz. 1981) illustrates the breadth of the standard of relevancy 
which has been employed by the courts. In that case, an attorney 
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filed a complaint before the Commission on Judicial Qualifications 
against a Justice of the Peace and in the course thereof published 
allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff, a stranger to 
those proceedings. The court, nevertheless, found the absolute 
privilege principle applicable so long as the statements bore some 
relationship to the proceeding. Addressing the required relevance, 
the court stated: 
The defense of absolute privilege is available 
if the defamatory statements have some relation to 
the judicial proceedings, even though they may not 
constitute evidence relevant and material from a 
strictly legal evidentiary viewpoint, [citation 
omitted] A defamatory statement contained in 
pleadings is absolutely privileged if it is 
connected with, has any bearing on, or is related 
to the subject of inquiry. If the party is made 
subject of a suit for defamation, all doubts as to 
relevancy should be resolved in his favor. [636 
P.2d at 146] 
Similarly, in Club Valencia Homeowners v. Valencia 
Associates, supra, the court held that the absolute privilege 
attached to letters from counsel to a homeowners association with 
respect to prospective litigation, stating: 
To be privileged, the alleged defamatory 
matter must have been made in reference to the 
subject matter of the proposed or pending 
litigation, although it need not be strictly 
relevant to any issue involved in it. [citations 
omitted] The pertinency required is not technical 
legal relevancy, but rather a general frame of 
reference and relation to the subject matter of 
the litigation. [citation omitted] Thus, the 
privilege embraces anything that possibly may be 
relevant. [712 P.2d at 1027] 
The question of whether an alleged defamatory statement is 
sufficiently relevant to the lawsuit to give rise to the absolute 
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privilege is always a question of law which is reserved exclusively 
for the court to decide. Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. 
Witherspoon, 657 P.2d 101, 105 (Nev. 1983); Jensen v. Olson, 141 
N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn. 1966). 
It is simply beyond dispute in the present case that the 
substance of the communications which occurred between 
Leonczynska!s husband and Mr. Elegante prior to the filing of the 
Discrimination Lawsuit were at the very core of the issues involved 
in the disqualification motion. Those issues included whether the 
communications had given rise to an attorney/client relationship 
and whether the content of the communications was substantially 
related to the Discrimination Lawsuit. See, e.g., Smith v. 
Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Leonczynska1s husband sought disqualification of PB&L on 
an extremely broad basis, at one point claiming that all 
communications he had with Mr. Elegante constituted the basis for 
disqualification of PB&L. Thus, all communications between Mr. 
Elegante and Leonczynska•s husband were placed in issue. The 
allegedly defamatory statements complained about by Leonczynska 
were made during the course of a conversation between the Elegantes 
and the Leonczynskis which occurred at the Elegante home in 
February 1984. In fact, during this same conversation, Mr.Elegante 
had informed Leonczynska' s husband that he did not want to hear 
about his legal problems until Mr. Elegante had a chance to check 
any possible conflicts. Moreover, the alleged defamatory 
statements were relevant because they supported the position of Mr. 
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Elegante and PB&L that the communications with Leonczynska's 
husband prior to the filing of the Discrimination Lawsuit were 
"theoretical" in nature and not in specific relation to Mr. 
Leonczynski's problems with American Express. 
Leonczynska also argues that the statement contained in Mr. 
Elegante's affidavit is not privileged because it had to be seen 
by other people, such as the PB&L secretary who typed it, outside 
the courtroom. This contention is frivolous and would virtually 
emasculate the privilege. Obviously, any time allegedly defamatory 
statements are contained in affidavits, pleadings or depositions, 
those statements will be seen or heard by someone outside of court. 
The privilege does not simply apply to statements made in court, 
but to statements made during the course of judicial proceedings, 
whether inside or outside of the courtroom, as the authorities 
cited above demonstrate. For example, Restatement (2d) of Torts, 
Sec. 586 and Comment A thereto state: 
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged 
to publish defamatory matter concerning another in 
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial 
proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the 
course and as part of, a judicial proceeding in 
which he participates as counsel, if it has some 
relation to the proceeding. 
Comments: 
A. . . . the publication of defamatory matter 
by an attorney is protected not only when made in 
the institution of the proceedings or in the 
conduct of litigation before a judicial tribunal, 
but in conferences and other communications 
preliminary to the proceeding. 
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The cases cited by Leonczynska in her Brief do not detract 
from the foregoing principles. For example, in Wright v. Lawsonf 
530 P.2d 823 (Utah 1975), relied upon by Leonczynska, the 
defendants were shareholders of Marketing Systems, Inc. which 
entered into an acquisition agreement with Com Tel, Inc. The 
agreement provided for a transfer of all of the stock of Marketing 
Systems to Com Tel in exchange for a specific number of Com Tel 
shares. The defendants brought a suit in federal court against Com 
Tel and its directors, alleging breach of the agreement and fraud 
in connection therewith. Thereafter, counsel for the defendant 
shareholders sent a letter which the plaintiff directors claimed 
defamed them. The letter dealt almost exclusively with claimed 
wrongful actions which occurred at a shareholders meeting having 
nothing to do with the acquisition agreement. The Utah Supreme 
Court simply held that the fact that the letter contained a brief 
reference to the federal court action did not make the entire 
letter privileged because the statements made in the letter 
concerning the annual meeting had no relevance to the dispute 
concerning the acquisition agreement which was in litigation. 
Respondents have no quarrel with the decision in Wright, but the 
situation in Wright is a far cry from the facts of the present 
case.1 
Leonczynska also erroneously cites Green Acres Trust v. 
London, 688 P.2d 617, 621 (Ariz. 1984) for the proposition 
that "a speaker's motive is considered as a crucial element 
in the area of absolute privilege." [Brief, p. 7] 
However, the quotation from that case included in the Brief 
absolutely rebuts this claim. 
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Leonczynska's Brief on this appeal, which is replete with 
outlandishly libelous statements towards Respondents, demonstrates 
more clearly than Respondents ever could the wisdom of affording 
litigants an absolute privilege to make defamatory statements 
during the course of presenting their position in litigation. 
Absent the existence of the very absolute privilege which 
Leonczynska is now challenging, Leonczynska would be faced with 
defending a defamation action for her reckless charges. 
The district court clearly acted properly in determining 
that the alleged defamatory statements were absolutely privileged 
and in dismissing the Complaint. 
B. The District Court Properly Refused To Enter Default. 
On June 2, 1988, Respondents caused this case to be removed 
to federal court on the mistaken belief of counsel that removal was 
proper on the basis of diversity. Respondents promptly filed a 
Notice of Removal in state court, but neglected to pay a $10.00 fee 
which apparently was required. On June 7, 1988, Respondents filed 
in federal court the same Motion to Dismiss as was ultimately 
granted in state court. Leonczynska filed a response to that 
Motion both in federal court and in state court. When Respondents1 
counsel later realized that removal was not proper, Respondents 
promptly filed a Petition for Remand with the federal court. An 
Order remanding the case was signed on June 22, 1988. On June 23, 
1988, a Notice of Remand was filed in state court. 
On the afternoon of June 22, 1988, Leonczynska attempted 
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to have a Default Judgment entered against Respondents, even though 
she knew that the case had been removed to federal court and even 
though she knew that Respondents were actively litigating the case. 
Leonczynska did not present the court with the required Default 
Certificate, but only with an Affidavit and Request for Default 
Judgment in the amount sought in the Complaint. Leonczynska did 
not even present a proposed judgment. When the district court 
clerk would not enter a default judgment, Leonczynska filed her 
Request for Default Judgment on June 22, 1988, at 3:22 P.M. [R. 
251] Respondents filed their Motion to Dismiss in state court as 
a precaution less than one hour later on June 22, 1988, at 4:15 
p.m. [R. 249] At the same time, Respondents scheduled a hearing 
on the Motion to Dismiss for July 11, 1988, at 9:00 a.m. [R. 258] 
Five days later, on June 27, 1988, Leonczynska mailed out a notice 
scheduling a hearing on her default request for the same time as 
the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. [R. 488]. 
At the hearing on July 11, 1988, Judge Young refused to 
enter default on the basis that even if it was assumed for purposes 
of argument that a default existed, it was technical only, would 
readily be set aside and did not prejudice Leonczynska. The 
district court's determination in this regard was clearly proper. 
In the first place, no default existed. The case was 
removed to federal court. The state court had no jurisdiction to 
proceed further with the case unless and until the case was 
remanded. 28 U.S.C., Sec. 1446(e); Polyplastics Inc. v. 
Transconex, Inc., 713 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1983); Artists1 
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Representatives Ass'n. Inc. v. Haley, 274 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1966) 
(later remand does not validate state court order after removal.) 
Even if Respondents had failed to file a copy of the Removal 
Petition in state court (as opposed to neglecting to pay the $10.00 
fee) , that would not have ousted the federal court of jurisdiction. 
Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 
434 F.Supp 1053 (D.C.N.Y. 1977); Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 
770 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1985). During the time the case was 
pending in federal court, Respondents timely filed a Motion to 
Dismiss. As a precaution, Respondents also filed the Motion to 
Dismiss in state court on June 22, 1988, the same day the Order 
remanding the case to state court was signed and one day before the 
Notice of Remand was filed in state court. Leonczynska approved 
the Order of Remand as to form. Further, Leonczynska1s argument 
that the case had not been removed because Respondents did not pay 
the $10.00 fee was rejected by the federal court and was not 
appealed. [See Leonczynska's "Motion to Relief From Order of 
Remand" and the federal court's Order attached hereto as Appendix 
A and B. Respondents request this court to take judicial notice 
of these pleadings.] That determination is binding on Leonczynska. 
Moreover, even if it is assumed that Respondents were in 
default as of June 22, 1988, when Leonczynska requested entry of 
Default Judgment, Leonczynska did not follow the proper procedures 
to have a default entered by the clerk. Leonczynska complains that 
the clerk did not enter a Default Judgment under Rule 55 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, under Rule 55, the clerk 
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is only authorized to enter a judgment if the claim is for a sum 
certain. In this case, where the damages sought were not 
liquidated, an evidentiary hearing before the court would have been 
required to establish the amount of damages, if any, before a 
default judgment could have been entered. Russell v. Martell, 681 
P.2d 1193 (Ut. 1984); Finch v. Big Chief Drilling Co., 56, F.R.D. 
456 (E.D., Tex. 1972). The only action the clerk could have taken 
in this case would have been to sign a Default Certificate. 
However, not only didn't Leonczynska present the clerk with a 
proposed judgment, she did not even present the clerk with a 
Default Certificate. The only documents presented by Leonczynska 
were an Affidavit and a Request for Default Judgment. The clerk 
was not required to prepare Leonczynskafs pleadings for her. 
Moreover, even if the clerk could have entered a default judgment, 
the clerk could not have done so unless and until the Default 
Certificate was entered. P & B Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 
274 (Utah App. 1988). 
Within an hour after Leonczynska filed her default 
documents, Respondents, as a precaution, filed their Motion to 
Dismiss in state court. Leonczynska did not even notice up a 
hearing before the judge on her request for a default judgment 
until five days later. By the time the Request for Default 
Judgment came before the court on July 11, no default existed. 
Unless and until a Default Certificate or judgment is entered, a 
party is entitled to file a responsive pleading, even though late. 
DeTore v. Local No. 245. etc., 511 F.Supp. 171 (D.N.J. 1981); Dr. 
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ING. H.C.F. Porsche AG v. Zim. 481 F.Supp. 1247, 1248 at fn.l 
(N.D. Texas 1979). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the district court 
refused to enter a default under the circumstances of this case 
where it was absolutely clear that the case was being actively 
litigated by Respondents and, in fact, at the time of the hearing 
on Leonczynska's request to have default entered, Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss was also heard. Under these circumstances, the 
court acted well within its discretion in refusing to enter 
Respondents1 default and that default would have been routinely set 
aside under Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, See, 
e.g. , Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962); 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larson Contractor, 
Inc. , 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975); McKniaht v. Webster, 499 F.Supp. 
420 (E.D. Penn. 1980). 
Leonczynska complains at length that the court violated her 
constitutional rights to "fundamental fairness and an access to the 
court" by refusing to enter default judgment against Respondents. 
To the contrary, the only party who attempted to deny anyone fair 
play, fundamental fairness and access to the courts was Leonczynska 
by her attempt to have Respondentsf default entered without notice 
or warning, based upon a hypertechnical reading of the removal 
statutes and court rules. 
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C. The District Court Did Not Err in Proceeding With The 
Hearing On The Motion to Dismiss, 
Finally, Leonczynska argues that the district court 
violated her constitutional rights by proceeding with the Motion 
to Dismiss because she supposedly was not notified of the hearing 
on the motion. This argument is without merit. 
The record clearly indicates that Leonczynska was mailed 
a copy of the Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum, Affidavit of Keith 
Taylor and Notice of Hearing on June 22, 1988. [R. 249-250 and 
258-259]. The hearing was scheduled for July 11, 1988. Five days 
later, on June 27, 1988, Leonczynska sent out a notice scheduling 
a hearing on her Request for Default for the same time. Further, 
on July 5, 1988, she mailed out a Motion to Strike the Taylor 
Affidavit which she had been mailed. At the hearing on the Motion 
to Dismiss, Leonczynska acknowledged receiving the motion. 
[Transcript of July 11, 1988 Hearing, R. 548 at p. 9] At the 
hearing, Leonczynska asked for time both to argue her default 
motion and to rebut Respondents1 Motion to Dismiss and Leonczynska 
actually did argue the Motion to Dismiss. [Id. at p. 9-13] 
Leonczynska did not file an affidavit under Rule 56(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise suggest to the court below 
what evidence could be marshalled by her to somehow avoid the 
absolute privilege which protected the alleged defamatory 
statements in the present case. The district court was not 
required to believe Leonczynska*s assertion that she did not 
receive notice or allow her additional time to no purpose. The 
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district court clearly acted well within its discretion in hearing 
the Motion to Dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the district court's Order dismissing the Complaint should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this 7 — day of April, 1989. 
STEPHE&JB- MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _7 day of April, 1989, four 
true and correct copies of Respondents' Brief was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Malgorzata Jung-Leonczynska 
Appellant Pro Se 
Aspen Square 
PO Box 6044 






Laramie, Wyoming 82C70 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
****************************** 
MALG0R2ATA JUNG - LEONC ZYNSKA 
Plaintiff - pro se 
(Respondent) 
v. 
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL RELATED 
SERVICES CO, INC., TRAVELERS 
CHEQUE OPERATIONS CENTER 
JAMES M. ELEGANTE; - individual 
MARY A. ELEGANTE - individual 
PARSONS, 3EHLE & LATIMER LAW FIRM-
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, 
and 
JOHN DOSS 1 - 5 
Defendants 
(Petitioners) 
CCMSS NOW plaintiff-respond nt and moves the Court pursuant to the 
Rule 60 (b)(2)&(5) F.R.C.P. to relief the respondent from ORDER OF REMAND, signed by 
Jud-e J.Thorsas Greene Jr. on June 21st,1?88, entered on June 22nd,1988, for reasons 
of fraud upon this Court and nisrepresentation of the adverse parties and its counse] 
Mr.Richard D.Burbid^e. 
This Motion should be -ranted for reasons as follows! 
1. The defendants and their counsel intentionally .sade a false represents 
' tion of fact by words and by conduct, by false and nisleadin- asserta-
tion, and by concealment upon this Court and respondent that the civi 





MOTION TO RELIEF FROM 
ORDER OF RSIlAND 
Civil No.: 33-C-C4?3 G 
RULE 60 (b)(2)&0) F.R.C.P. 
( S t a t e Court C iv i l No. : 
C-35-01577 , Third D i s t r i c t 
Court , Sa l t Lake Ccur.ty,Utah 
WITH REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY 
H E A R I N G 
action No.t C-38-C1577 wa^renoved from t.ne Ttiird District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Utah,to this United States District Court. 
2. Defendants and their counsel at least knowingly did not comply with 
the provisions of 23 U.5.C.1446 (e) and they intentionally made a 
false representation which led the mind of the Court and respondent 
to an apprehension of the conditions other and different from that 
which existed, and were calculated for^the purpose of inducing the 
Court and respondent in reliance upon it and to surrender legal rights 
by respondent. 
5# Defendants and their counsel intentionally perverted the truth and 
concealed the fact that the civil action was never removed from the 
State Court to this Court. 
4. Defendants and their counsel intentionally submitted to Hon,J.Thomas 
3reene Jr, the U.S.Judge two proposed orders with false statements 
and false representation that the civil action "...was first removed...* 
from the State Court, what was done for the purpose to mislead this 
Court and respondent, and concealed the facts which should have been 
disclosed that notice upon the State Court with due fee was not given. 
5. Defendants and their counsel intentionally deceived this Court and 
respondent so that she acted upon it to her legal injury including 
'approval as to form*the second proposed order. 
On July 11th,1988 plaintiff-respondent newly discovered evidence that 
this Court Order of Remand signed on June 21st, 1988,entered on June 22nd,1983,lordered 
that within action is forthwith remanded to the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from which the action was first removed." was 
rendered based upon fraud and false representation upon this Court. 
The matter of fact is that the civil action no time was removed from 
the State Court to the Federal Court because defendants-petitioner and their counsel 
did not comply with the provisions of 23 U.S.C. Section 1446 (e). 
Petitioners did not file a copy of the Petition for Removal with the 
Clerk of the State Court and due fee was not paid. 
Since petitioners knew that their action no time effected removal, they 
perverted the truth and made a false representation to this Court and iespondent to 
propose the said Order of Remand. 
This kind of artifice was employed by defendants-petitioners and counsel 
for the purpose to deceive this Court and respondent. 
It should be underlined that if petitioners and counsel had diclosed 
the truth regarding the facts of not complying with the law, this Court would not 
have signed the said Order for Remand. 
The same applies to respondent as well who approved it as a form» 
Elementary rules of logic dictates that a case which never was remove 
could not be remanded, however, it was possible only because this Court and 
respondent aa well relied on allegations which in fact were fraud and has been 
perpetrated upon this Court. 
In light of the above respondent respectfully prays as follows! 
1. to set aside the said Order for Remand. 
2. to schedule evidentiary hearing as soon as possible after July 25» 
on which respondent desires* to call for direct examination* 
- all defendants 
- Mr. 3urbidge \
 fron Burbidge k ydtchell U w Firm 
- kr© Shaughnessy) 
- Ms. Barber \
 frQm t h e T h i r d D i s t rict Court 
- Mr. Shewell J 
3« to r e l i e f p l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e n t from the Order for Remand. 
and t h i s Motion should be granted for t he sake of j u s t i c e . 
DATED t h i s J^ day of Ju ly 1933. 
Ifelgofzata. Jung - La6nczyns£a 
(f te^ondent) 
FILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I n a i l e d , pos tage prepaid 
a t r u e and co r rec t copy of t h e foregoing Motion 
t o Re l i e f froa Order of Remand t o t h e following 
on t h i s l \ day of Ju ly 1938J 
" ^ ATTEST: A TRUE COPY 
3urbidg. & Mi tchel l Law Finn MARKUS B. ZIMMER, CLERK 
159 East South Teaple, # 2CC1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUFT 
Salt Lake C i ty , Utah 54111 ^WSTRICT OF UTAH 
( / / OEPUTY L^ERK 
M« Jun ' -Leonc zwiska 
' / / / 
r'S'i 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
MALGORZATA JUNG-LEONCZYNSKA, 
Plaintiff, pro se, 
vs. 
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL 
RELATED SERVICES CO., INC., 
TRAVELERS CHEQUE OPERATIONS 
CENTER; JAMES M. ELEGANTE, 
individual; MARY A. ELEGANTE, 
individual; PARSONS, BEHLE 
& LATIMER LAW FIRM, a 
Professional corporation; 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 88-C-0493-G 
Plaintiff's "Motion To [sic] Relief From Order of Remand" 
and Plaintiff's "Motion to Continue" the hearing on the "Motion To 
[sic] Relief From Order of Remand" came on regularly before the 
above-entitled court on December 6, 1988, at the hour of 11:15 a.m. 
Defendants appeared by and through their counsel, Richard D. 
Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell, and the Plaintiff did not appear. 
The court having reviewed the file in this matter, having 
heard arguments of counsel and being fully apprised in the 
APPENDIX B D 
premises, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: The Motion 
To [sic] Relief From Order of Remand and Motion to Continue are 
hereby denied. 
BY THE COURT 
H ( ^ " 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the (0 day of December, 1988, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Malgorzata Jung-Leonczynska 
Aspen Square 
PO Box 6044 
Laramie , Wyoming 82070 
ddPBL-MalJ.Len 
Copies mailed to counsel, 12-14-88jm 
Malgorzata Jung-Leonczynska 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. 
ATTEST: A TRUE COPY 
MARKUS B. ZIMMER. CLERK 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OFJITAH 
BVC3Y fr>W£ 
DEPUTV^ERK 
